Why aircraft owners — not tracking platforms — should decide who follows their flights. The story of the not so invisible pilot
written by Peter Sodermans
A few days ago, while looking at traffic over the Mediterranean, two small aircraft caught my attention.
Two Blackwings were flying northbound, returning to Europe after spending the winter in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where they had been deployed for an expedition and a series of demonstration flights. The aircraft had remained in the region for several months, but with tensions involving Iran increasing and the risk of a wider regional conflict no longer unthinkable, the decision was made to ferry both aircraft back to Europe.
Long overwater legs, careful fuel planning, patient progress across the sea — the kind of flying that still represents the essence of general aviation: independence, preparation and trust in both pilot and machine.
On Flightradar24, the aircraft appeared almost anonymous. No registration. No identity. Just two light aircraft moving slowly across a vast blue map.
Out of curiosity, I opened another tracking platform.
On FlightAware, the same aircraft appeared again — this time fully identifiable, with registration, aircraft photos and flight history visible to anyone online.
And then, on ADS-B Exchange, the aircraft appeared with even fewer filters — raw ADS-B data, fully visible, exactly as transmitted.
Same flight. Same signal.Three platforms.Three completely different levels of exposure.
And one obvious question:
Who decides whether a private flight becomes public information?
Because it certainly wasn’t any of the Blackwing pilots.
ADS-B was built for safety — not for spectators
ADS-B exists for one reason: safety. Aircraft broadcast position, altitude and identification so controllers and pilots can maintain situational awareness and avoid collisions. Few pilots would willingly give that up today.
But ADS-B was never intended to create a public tracking ecosystem.
Yet platforms such as Flightradar24 and FlightAware collect these safety broadcasts through worldwide (mainly american) receiver networks and redistribute them globally in real time. Anyone with a smartphone can follow private aircraft movements across borders.
And ADS-B Exchange goes one step further, publishing unfiltered broadcast data based on the principle that any openly transmitted signal is public by nature.
A ferry flight becomes public data.
A weekend flight becomes searchable history.
A personal journey becomes permanent visibility.
All without consent.
The missing principle: owner consent
Pilots accept obligations when they improve safety. We install transponders. We comply with ADS-B mandates. We broadcast our position.
But nowhere did aircraft owners agree that their flights would automatically be published online.
The principle should be simple:
If aircraft owners do not explicitly consent, their flight data should not be publicly displayed.
Not after submitting requests. Not after discovering your aircraft online by accident. Consent must come first — not as an opt-out mechanism, but as the default.
Europe regulates pilots — but not publication
European aviation regulates pilots in extraordinary detail: licensing, procedures, airspace compliance and operational behaviour. GDPR is everywhere. At the time I was President of AOPA Luxembourg, we were even obliged to ask consent of our members first prior that we could send them a simple newsletter in order to comply with GDPR legislation.
Yet when private flight movements are published worldwide via tracking platforms, responsibility becomes blurred. This is completely ridiculous and wrong.
A privately owned aircraft is often directly linked to an identifiable individual through national registers. Anyone can reconstruct travel patterns or home bases simply by watching tracking websites.
This is not about legal theory. It is about a basic ownership principle: flying safely should not automatically mean flying publicly.
When tracking leaves the enthusiast world
Tracking platforms often present themselves as tools for enthusiasts — and many users indeed watch aircraft simply out of curiosity.
But reality has evolved.
European pilots increasingly encounter situations where publicly available tracking data from Flightradar24 , FlightAware and Adsbexchange is referenced when flights are questioned, criticised or interpreted by third parties far removed from the cockpit.
A digital map creates certainty without context. A routing choice looks suspicious. An altitude change invites speculation. A recreational flight becomes analysed data.
Sorry guys, but ADS-B was never designed for that purpose.
The absurd reversal
Today, pilots who value privacy must actively request removal from tracking platforms.
You must contact Flightradar24. Sometimes also FlightAware. And then discover your aircraft still visible elsewhere.
Think about the logic. You must ask permission not to be tracked. Publication is automatic. Privacy requires effort. The relationship between owner and publisher has been reversed.
The default should be invisibility unless authorised.
ADS-B Exchange: the place where invisible pilots reappear
Even after removal requests, aircraft often remain visible on ADS-B Exchange. The platform follows a different philosophy: ADS-B transmissions are public broadcasts, therefore they are published without filtering. Technically, this argument is correct. ADS-B signals are openly receivable radio transmissions.
But for pilots, it highlights a fundamental shift. Blocking visibility is no longer a single decision. It becomes a continuous effort across multiple platforms — with no guarantee of success. The “invisible pilot” does not truly disappear. He simply becomes visible somewhere else.
A specifically European concern
General aviation in Europe already operates under growing pressure: shrinking airspace, increasing administrative complexity and rising costs.
Uncontrolled public tracking adds exposure that private aviation never requested. Airlines operate public transport — transparency is logical. Private flying is different.
A personal aircraft is not public infrastructure. It is private mobility conducted responsibly under aviation rules. Pilots accepted visibility for safety. They did not agree to permanent public exposure.
Time to change the default
The solution is simple.
Tracking platforms should adopt one clear principle:
No consent — no public display.
Air traffic control still receives ADS-B data. Safety systems continue to function. Nothing changes operationally. Only public publication requires approval from the aircraft owner.That restores balance between safety and personal freedom.
The invisible pilot
Those two Blackwings crossing the Mediterranean were not trying to hide. They were simply flying — managing distance, weather and fuel like generations of pilots before them. Yet today every flight creates a parallel journey: a digital trail followed by strangers far removed from the cockpit.
Pilots equipped their aircraft for safer skies. They never agreed to become publicly tracked objects. And perhaps the real question is no longer whether pilots can become invisible — but why they should have to try.
EASA and the European Commission can no longer ignore this contradiction. ADS-B was introduced for safety, not for public redistribution. Europe must take firm action to prevent the misuse of aviation safety data and restore the principle that consent — not publication — is the default.
