I think we need to treat the high-end ULM / microlight segment (Blackwing, Shark, VL3, Risen, Bristell, Ellipse, etc.) as its own category, and update the regulatory approach accordingly.
1) This is now a serious European industry.
These are European-designed, European-built products with real engineering maturity and a growing support ecosystem. Europe should back its own industry instead of constraining it with legacy boundaries. Especially now.
2) The “600 kg MTOW” line is increasingly an artefact
It may have made sense as a simple limit at some point, but reality in the field has moved on. These aircraft have evolved (performance, structures, systems), while legislation has not. The success of this segment did not happen despite deregulation — it happened because of it. The lesson is clear: keep rules simple, practical, and aligned with what is actually being flown, not with outdated numbers.
3) For experienced GA pilots, the value proposition is real
I have flown certified GA for decades (Mooney, Cessna, etc.) and high-end ULMs have rightly been “seducing” many serious pilots for very concrete reasons:
Whole-aircraft parachute: in many scenarios, this is a major safety enhancement and changes risk management in a practical way. Short-field capability: in my certified touring aircraft I typically wanted ~600 m as a comfort margin. With this class, it can be far less — which increases options when something goes wrong and you need a suitable landing spot. Fuel and cost efficiency is not marginal — it is dramatic. Example on 100 hours/year (Mogas €1.50/L, Avgas €2.50/L): Cessna 182: 45 L/h Avgas → 4,500 L/year → €11,250/year Mooney: 40 L/h Avgas → 4,000 L/year → €10,000/year High-end ULM (e.g. Blackwing-class): 16 L/h Mogas → 1,600 L/year → €2,400/year Savings vs ULM (100h/year): vs C182: €8,850/year vs Mooney: €7,600/year And that is only fuel. At 200 hours/year, simply double it. Capability and equipment: modern autopilots, variable-pitch propellers and (on some types) retractable gear — these aircraft are properly equipped touring machines.
4) Culture matters: high-end ULM pilots often know their machines better
One thing I genuinely like in the high-end ULM environment is the mindset: pilots tend to deep-dive into the practical and maintenance aspects of their aircraft. They understand their systems, they inspect properly, they know what they are operating. In certified GA, too many pilots end up outsourcing their curiosity: check the oil level, sign the tech log, and that’s it — without ever really looking “under the cowling”. That is not a criticism of certified aviation as such, but it is a reason why this community often develops strong operational competence.
5) Europe should stop trying to regulate everything
This category is a perfect example of where Europe risks suffocating success with paperwork. High-end ULMs became what they are because regulation was lighter, more pragmatic, and closer to reality. The right approach is not to rebuild a mini Part-23 on top of microlights. Europe should learn from what worked: clear boundaries, proportionate rules, and responsibility where it belongs — with competent pilots and maintainers.
6) Cross-border reality should be acknowledged, not ignored
Cross-border flying with high-end ULM can be slightly more complex than with certified aircraft, mainly because of national differences and occasional permissions. But in many countries there is effectively no extra burden at all, and the practical reality is that people fly these aircraft internationally every day. Rather than adding layers, Europe should aim for simplification and mutual recognition, so rules match how this segment is actually used.
What I would like to see
A regulatory update that explicitly recognises this class and keeps the spirit of microlight success: simple rules, proportionate oversight, and boundaries that reflect actual aircraft capability and safety features — not legacy numbers. The market is already voting with its feet, and regulation should follow reality, not fight it.
